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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R.

J.

D..A.l... :JI CONSTRUCTION
CO~IP . .\.XY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
No. 7790

THO:JI. .\.S B. CHILD and C. \V.
CHILD, co-partners doing business
under the name and style of Thomas
B. Child and Company,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered December
5, 1951 dismissing the action upon the motion of the defendants (Record p. 60). For convenience the parties will
be referred to as they appeared in the court below.
The motion to dismiss was made at a;;·pre-trial hearing called by the Judge to whom the case had been assigned for trial by jury. No jury was called or empaneled. No Findings of Fact were made or signed by the
Judge or waived by the plaintiff, nor was any op1n1on
rendered by the Judge.
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THE PLEADINGS

The Complaint (Record pp. 1-2) alleged that the
defendants had made an offer to the plaintiff to furnish
all labor and 1naterials necessary for the completion of
the brickwork on firewalls at the Utah Genera~ Depot,
Ogden, Utah, according to plans and specifications for the
total of $91,392.00. That relying upon that bid the plaintiff submitted a bid to the Government to do the entire
work specified in the plans for a flat sum and was awarded the contract upon that bid. That the plaintiff accepted
the defendants' offer, that the defendants repudiated the
contract and refused to perform and that plaintiff was required to do the work which defendants had offered to
do on its ·own account at a cost to it in excess of $79,000
over defendants' bid.
The Answer of the defendants (Record pp. 3-5) admitted the offer, but denied that the plaintiff's bid to the
Government was made in reliance thereon and denied
that plaintiff had accepted it. They alleged that the plaintiff tendered to defendants a form of contract which
varied from their bid in material respects. The Answer
also denied the damage claimed.
PROCEEDINGS

At the instance of the defendants, the deposition
of R. C. Riding, the superintendent of the plaintiff and
the individual by whom all negotiations on behalf of the
plaintiff in connection with the contract were carried on,
was t~aken January 20, 1951. On the same date the deposition of Mr. Thomas B. Child, one of the defendant
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partners and the individual by \vhoin all negotiations
on behalf of the defendants \vere carried on, was taken
at plaintiff's instance. (These depositions are incorporated in the Record as a separate document of 118 pages
and given Record page numbers beginning at page 102.)
Thereafter the case \vas assigned for trial vvithout a
jury upon den1and of the plaintiff and was later transferred to the jury calendar on motion of the defendants
(Record pp. 6-10). It \vas assigned to Judge Levvis of the
District Court for trial during S-eptember, 1951. Judge
Lewis called the case for pre-trial, and after pretrial conference he entered an order in which the parties were
directed to file a vvritten stipulation (of facts) before
September 14th (Record pp. 11-12).
No stipulation was entered into by the parties until
Septe1nber 29, 1951 when the stipulation found at pages
14 to 29 of the Record was signed by counsel for both
parties and submitted to Judge Lewis. This stipulation
\vas used as a basis for the facts agreed upon by counsel
at the subsequent pretrial before Judge Ellett (Record
pp. 30-55). Those agreed facts ~s well as those upon
which no agreement was reached will be stated below.
~feanwhile the case had been transferred to Judge
Ellett, who called a pretrial conference on October 16th.
At this conference counsel for defendants refused to
agree that the evidence as recorded in the depositions and
stipulation might be considered and weighed by the court
for the purpose of determining as a matter of law
whether a contract had or had not been entered into by
the parties (Record pp. 31-34) In addition, the plaintiff
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withheld its consent that the judge might weigh the evidence and decide the case as a trier of the facts (Record
pp. 52-3). Trial by jury was not waived by either side.
At the close of the pretrial conference "the plaintiff
1noved for an order holding the case for trial on the
question of damages, the defendants moved to dismiss
and the court set a date for argument (Record pp. 52-53).
The argu1nents were heard October 20th and the court
took the motions under advisement (Record p. 58). On
October 26th, according to the entry in the register and
the entries on the page prepared for the minutes of the
court (Record p. 59) which on November 28th were still
unsigned and bore no record of having been seen or approved by the Judge, he decided the motions (Record
p. 61), denying the motion of the plaintiff and granting
the motion to dismiss. On December 5, 1951, a formal
order dismissing the action was signed by the Judge and
entered by the clerk (Record p. 60).
THE EVIDENCE

The facts, both conceded and disputed, before the
court at the time of the motions are as follows:
The Government issued an Invitation to contractors
to submit bids for the construction of firewalls in certain
buildings located at the Ogden General Depot, Ogden,
according to plans and specifications which had been prepared therefor (Stipulation, Record pp·. 15, 35). The
specifications called for the erection of twelve~ brick walls
in four different buildings and the installation of rolling
steel firedoors in each wall and for an alternate bid for
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the 'vork in cnse the C oYerninent should decide· to install
the firedoors later and brick in the doorways in the mean'vhile (See Exhibit _._\, including Invitation for Bids and
Bid Forn1 included therein). Subsequently the Governnlent issued an Addendum to the specifications which
called for an alternate bid for the construction of the
'valls and the installation of sliding steel firedoors instead of rolling doors, and the bids for the "\York if the
door,vays 'vere bricked in (See Exhibit B, Addendum
Ko. 1 and Bid Form included). In the Bid form accompanying Addendum No. 1 the bid for rolling doors "\vas
designated as Schedule I and the bid for sliding doors
designated as Schedule II. The bids weTe to he opened
June 22, 1950 at 2 P.M.
Section SC-1 of the Special Conditions of the Specifications referred to in the Invitation for Bids (Exhibit
A) provided:
"The contractor will be required to commence
work under this contract within ten (10) calendar
days after date of receipt by him of written notice
to proceed, to prosecute said work with faithfulness and energy, and to complete the entire work
ready for use not later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the date of receipt of the said
notice to proceed. The time stated for completion
shall include final cleanup of the premises."
Section SC-16 of the S·pecial Conditions provided:
"In case of failure on the part of the contractor to complete the work within the time fixed in
the contract or any extensions thereof, the con-
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tractor shall pay the Government as liquidated
damages the sum of Fifty ($50) Dollars for each
calendar day of delay until the work is completed
or accepted."
The plaintiff, a contracting corporation, intended
to subn1it a bid for the· work and on June 20th Mr. Riding, its superintendent, called Mr. Tho1nas B. Child, a
member of the defendant partnership long engaged in
masonry and brickwork construction, and asked if they
wished to submit a bid to do the brickwork on the project.
Mr. Child said he would if he could se·e the plans and specifications, so Mr. Riding delivered and left with Mr.
Child a set of the plans and specifications (Exhibit A)
and discussed the proposed work with him. Mr. Riding
did not give Mr. Child a copy of the Addendum No.1 at
this time or at all (Record pp. 36-38; Stipulation paragraphs 4, 5 and 6; Record p. 15).
Mr. Child telephoned to the plaintiff a proposal to
do the brickwork called for on the morning of June 22nd
(Record p. 37; Stipulation paragraph 7, Record p. 16),
and on the fo~lowing day confirmed it by letter (Record
pp. 39, 43; Stipulation paragraphs 7-8; Record p. 17).
Mr. Riding received the telephone bid, used the quotation
in figuring the plaintiff's bid to the Government and
submitted it before the time set for the opening (Record
p. 41). The .plain tiff was the low bidder (Record p. 17).
Shortly after the bids to the Government were opened but before the contract had been a:warded, Mr. Riding
told Mr. Child that the defendants' bid had been the
lowest bid for the brickwork that plaintiff had received
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and that he had used Child's bid in figuring plaintiff's
bid. He also told nlr. Child that plajntiff's bid to the
Governn1ent ha.d been lo\Y and that \Yhen they got fixed
up \Yith the contrart the defendants could expect to get
a contract for the brick\vork (Record p. 42, Stipulation
paragraph 1~, Record p. 17).
One week after the bid opening, the plaintiff was
a\varded the contract on the basis of the Government's
acceptance of plaintiff's bid of $190,392.00 for the entire
job \Yith the installation of rolling steel doors on Schedule
I of plaintiff's bid (Record pp. 40-41; Stipulation paragraph 16; Record p. 19), which was the identical work
specified in the plans and specifications delivered to
Mr. Child as above stated (see Exhibits A and B). (Note:
The reference to Schedule II on page 41 of the Record
is erroneous.)
On July 3rd according to Mr. Riding (Deposition
p. 20), but !\Ir. Child thought it was earlier (Deposition
p. 98), Mr. Riding called Mr. Child and asked him if he
would rather set the reinforcing steel as his work progressed or have Daum Company or some other subcontractor set it. !\fr. Child told him that he would rather
place it himself provided the steel was cut, bent and
designed properly.
The general contract was dated June 29, 1950 (Answer, Record p. 3) and under date of July 10, 1950 the
Government issued its formal notice to the plaintiff to
proceed and to commence work within 10 days after receipt of the notice as provided in Sec. SC-1 of the Specifications (Exhibit A). The notice to proceed was received
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by the plaintiff at Inglewood, California on July 13
(Record p. 19) .
On July 11th the plaintiff mailed from its office at
Inglewood, California, to the defendants at Salt Lake
t\vo copies of a form of Subcontract Agreement dated
the sarne day and signed by the plaintiff (Exhibit C).
These were on printed forms, the blanks in which had
been filled in with typewriting giving the date, the names
of the parties, referred to as Contractor and Subcontractor respectively, a reference to the Government Contract
and referred to the portion of the· work to be done by the
Subcontractor (defendants) as "Brickwork." Then there
was inserted the following :
"Ti1ne is of the essence of this contract. General Contract to be completed within 120 calendar
days. $50.00 per day penalty thereafter. Sub-contractor to complete its work as scheduled."
The form also included Addendum 1 as part of the specification for the work to be performed. No other of the
many blanks in the printed form were filled in except
the price to be paid subcontractor for his work, $91,392.00, in payments equal to 90% of the work done by the
subcontractor during the preceding month and the balance 10% to be paid within 35 days after completion and
acceptance of the project by the Government.
These Subcontract forms were transmitted to the
defendants with a letter dated July 11th requesting the
defendants to sign and return one to the plaintiff (Record
p. 44; Stipulation paragraph 19; Record p. 21). This
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letter and subcontraet foTn1s \Yere received by the defendants on or before July 13th and before the next conversation bet,veen the plaintiff and the defendants (Depositions, Riding p. 2:2, Child p. 100-101), on July 14th.
~leanwhile ~Ir. Child had told the Interstate Brick
Company that he 'vas expecting to sign up with the plaintiff for the job and had obtained the price of brick delivered at the job. l\fr. Child testified that he had not
placed an order for 1,200,000 brick but had just told them
(the Brick Company) that he expected to get the job
(Record, Deposition Child, page 109). 1fr. Riding testified, however, that after the defendants had refused to
go ahead with the vvork l\1:r. Child told him that he would
turn over his order for brick on the project to the plaintiff and that he had on order 1,200,000 brick for this particular project (Deposition, Riding, pp. 26-27 -28).
On July 14th Mr. Riding called Mr. Child by telephone to make an appointment to have Mr. Child go to
Ogden with him and meet the other subcontractors there
and go over the work and get his ideas how he would like
to handle his part of the work. Mr. Child agreed to ride
up with Riding at 9 o'clock the next morning and said
nothing about having received the subcontract forms or
having any objections to its terms or provisions (Deposition, Riding p. 21). Mr. Child said that in this conversation Riding wanted him to go over the job with him and
that Child then told him they had received the forn1 of
contract and had decided not to sign the j·ob up· (Deposition, Child p. 99).
The following morning, July 15th, Mr. Riding called
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on Mr. Child at his home when for the first time, according to Riding, Mr. Child told him that he and his brothers
had met the night before and had decided not to go
through with the contract because of the conditions
following the outbreak of the war in Korea, that they had
been losing men and because of the insertion in the subcontract form of the words "general contract to be completed within 120 calendar days" and "$50.00 per day
penalty thereafter." It was in this conversation that Mr.
Child offered to turn over to the plaintiff his order for
the 1,200,000 brick he had expected to use on the job (Deposition, Riding, pp. 22-28).
Mr. Riding offered to strike from the S-ubcontract
form the clause "$50.00 per day penalty thereafter" but
~Ir. Child still refused to go ahead (Deposition, p. 23). ·
~fr. Child denied that Riding had offered to strike anything from the S.ubcontract Form and his version of the
conversation at this time is contained in his Deposition
at pages 100-103.
There is no evidence that the defendants had withdrawn· their offer until after they had received the subcontract from the plaintiff or, according to plaintiff's
testimony, before the meeting of Mr. Child and Mr. Riding on the morning of July 14th after Mr. Child had
agreed to go to Ogden to lay out the work.
Under date of July 25th the plaintiff wrote the
defendants a letter requesting them to advise plaintiff
by 5 o'clock July 29th of their willingness to proceed to
carry out the terms of their proposal in default of which
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the plaintiff would make other arrangen1ents for the performance of the \York and hold the defendants responsible
for the damages (Record pp. 26-~7). The defendants replied by letter the following day . repeating their refusal
to go ahead, saying:

---In the subcontract which you submitted to us
under date of July 11, 1950 you added a material
variance to our proposal in that you required the
work to be completed within 120 calendar days
and provided for a $50 per day penalty thereafter
and which was not contemplated in our original
proposal.
'~The

writer discussed this matter with Mr.
Riding about two weeks ago "~hen he took up the
form of the subcontract you submitted and explained to Mr. Riding that we would not accept
the subcontract or execute it with the changes
both as to the time limit and the penalties, and
the writer explained further that because of present conditions and the changes in the labor market
by reason of war conditions and our loss of employees that we would not execute any subcontract
with you for this work."
The defendants never did sign any contract to do
the work and never did any work on the project (Record
p. 46; Record p. 26; Stipulation paragraph 24) and after
receipt of the defendants' letter of July 26th the plaintiff
let a subcontract to Clark Ivory to do the work for $95,000.00 (Record p. 49, Exhibit F). This contract was later
abrogated (Record p. 54) and the work was ultimately
completed by the plaintiff through other subcontracts.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY
POINT I.
THE FACTS WHICH WERE STIPULATED REQUIR.ED
A FINDNG AND CONCLUSION AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE OFFER OF THE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN
ACCEPTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT A CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE
PRIOR TO THE REFUSAL OF THE DEFENDANTS TO
PROCEED.

POINT II.
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS A CONFIRMATION OF THE PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER AND THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS BUT THE WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF THE CONTRACT
SO CREATED.

POINT III.
THE SUBCONTRACT FORM SUBMITTED TO DEFENDANTS WAS NOT A COUNTER-OFFER OR REJECTION OF
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSAL.

POINT IV.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE
EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT.

POINT V.
IF THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES AS STIPULATED
WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE
INTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE OFFER
OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
ACTS AND CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF TO CONVEY
SUCH INTENTION TO THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOB
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THE JURY, .AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS WAS ERROR.

POINT \TI.
THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
'VITHOUT FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, AND WITfiOUT
A MOTION FOR SUMlVIARY JUDGMENT AND NOTICE
THEREOF WAS ERROR .

.A.RGU1fENT
POINT I.
THE FACTS WHICH WERE STIPULATED REQUIRED
A FINDNG AND CONCLUSION AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE OFFER OF THE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN
ACCEPTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT A CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE
PRIOR TO THE REFUSAL OF THE DEFENDANTS TO
PROCEED.

Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. (2d) 1002
was an action by a subcontractor against the principal
contractor for breach of contract and damages. To establish the contract, the plaintiff relied upon certain acts
and conduct of the defendant as evidencing his acceptance of an offer by the plaintiff to haul roofing material
needed by the defendant in the performance of the general contract. The lower court had non suited the plaintiff
and dismissed the complaint. On appeal this court reviewed the evidence and said:

"* * * It is clear that the instrument signed by
the plaintiff was a.t least an offer to do the work
in question in accordance with its terms but before
it could become a binding contract the defendants
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would have to accept the same or assent to its
terms. This the defendants might have done by
a written or oral statement to that effect. If the
defendants had made such a statement the meaning of which was una1nbiguous, the interpretation
thereof would have been a question of law for the
court. Plain tiff does not rely on any such statement, but does rely on a series of acts and circumstances which he claims are a manifestation of
defendant's assent to and acceptance of plaintiff's
offer. * * *
"It is a well recognized rule of law that where
a contract is not required to he in writing, mutual
assent or the meeting of the minds may be proved
by words spoken as well as by acts and conduct.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, vT ol. 1,
Chapter 3, Section 21 says 'The manifestation of
mutual assent may be made wholly or partly by
written or spoken words or by other acts or conduct.'
" '17 C.J.S.. Contracts, p. 373, sec. 41a * * •
an acceptance need not be express or formal,
but may be shown by words, conduct, or acquiescence indicating assent to the proposal or offer.'"
In the present case, the plaintiff, by acts and conduct
communicated to the defendants, had clearly and unequivocably manifested its acceptance of their bid and
thereby had created a binding contract prior to the refusal by defendants to proceed with the work.
(a) Mr. Riding solicited the bid from the defendants and supplied them with the plans and specifications
to enable the defendants to intelligently figure their bid.
He used the defendants' figures in preparing the plain-
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tiff's bid to the Govern1nent, \Yhich bid upon opening
\Yas found to be lo\\~.
:Jir. l';hild, 'vho eYidently \Yas follovving the matter
closely and kne\Y that the plaintiff 'vas the lovv bidder,
called :Jir. Riding up to see if he, Child, had the job
(Child Deposition p. 97). ~lr. Riding told him that his bid
"~as lo\Y on the brick\\york, that he had used it in figuring
plaintiff's bid, that plaintiff's bid 'vas low and that he
expected to get the job. ~Ir. Riding said further (as
quoted by Jir. Child) :
'~You

kno'v how things are, it takes the Government quite a while to decide what they want,
but I think after we have got fixed up for it we
will give you a form of contract."
We submit that this was the equivalent of a statement by the plaintiff that it had accepted defendants'
bid conditioned only upon the Government awarding
plaintiff the contract on the basis of the specifications
upon which the defendants had bid.
(b) The conditional acceptance of plaintiff's bid
was made final upon the happenings of the condition.
The Government accepted plaintiff's bid on Schedule
I, that is, for the walls and installation of rolling steel
fire doors. That this was the type of construction and
installation upon which the defendants had bid is apparent from (1) the specifications, Exhibit A, (2) the terms
of plaintiff's bid (R. p. 16) and stipulation (R. p. 40-41)
and (3) the letter from the Army E'ngineers dated June
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29, 1950 and set out in paragraph 16 of the stipulation
(R. p. 19).
(c) While we recall no admission in the record of
when Mr. Child first learned that the contract had been
awarded to the plaintiff, it is reasonable to assume that
he knew of it very shortly thereafter. He was sufficiently
interested in the job to call up Mr. Riding just after the
opening "to see if he had the job" because "I had heard
-it was general conversation you know-that I was the
low bidder" and had Mr. Riding's promise to give him the
contract as soon as they (plaintiff) "got fixed up with the
job."
(d) On July 3rd Mr. Riding called him about setting the reinforcing steel. There was no occasion for
Mr. Riding's doing this unless the defendants were to
do the work and Mr. Child certainly so understood it.
He answered tha.t he would "put it in as he went along
with his brickwork, provided it was all bent, cut and designed properly" (Deposition Riding p·. 20). Mr. Child
already had Riding's assurance that they would' get the
job when the Government contract was awarded to plaintiff, and there could be no misunderstanding about the
terms since Mr. Child's letter of June 23rd was definite
as to the work to be done and as to price, and it was the
only offer the defendants had made to the plaintiff.
We submit that these conversations and communications evidenced a complete meeting of the minds of the
respective parties without any possibility of misunderstanding by either. Both of them understood that the
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defendants w·ere to do the brick,vork in accordance 'vith
their offer.
That ~fr. Child so understood it is evidenced by the
fact that he notified the Brick Company that he expected
to sign up "ith. Dam11 for the job and had ordered the
necessary brick, 1,200,000 brick.
There is not the slightest evidence in the record that
the defendants had ehanged their minds or that the offer
had been withdrawn until July 15th, when they repudiated the contract and refused to proceed with the work.
This "\vas over two weeks after the condition upon which
plaintiff had accepted the offer had been fulfilled and the
plaintiff had become bound to the Government under a
contract for a price which it had submitted in reliance
upon the defendants' offer.
The situation here is practically identical with that
upon which the Connecticut Supreme Court passed in
the case of Raff Co. v. Murphy, 147 Atl. 709. In that case
the plaintiff Raff Co. intended to bid on a contract which
called for plumbing and heating, but since plumbing was
out of its line, asked Murphy if he· was interested in
submitting a figure for the plumbing. Murphy agreed
to do so on condition that Raff would not obtain figures
from any one else to do the work and would give him
the job if Raff secured the contract. These conditions
were accepted by Raff. Murphy then submitted by telephone a bid of $14,300.00 and Raff asked him to confirm
the bid by letter, which Murphy agreed to do but did not,
and there was no written memorandum of the agreement
of the defendant Murphy to do the plumbing work. Raff
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incorporated Murphy's bid in its bid to the owner and
submitted it. Raff's bid was accepted and immediately
he informed Murphy of that fact and told him that immediately upon receipt of official notification he would notify
him. Murphy expressed his pleasure and appreciation
but two days later he called on Raff and said there had
been an error in his bid and that he couldn't go through
with the contract. Raff told him that he was sorry but
that he had accepted Murphy's bid in good faith and
was obliged to carry out his contract with the owner
and expected Murphy to abide by his bid.
Upon receipt of formal notification of acceptance of
Raff's bid, he advised the defendant and mailed him an
order to install the plumbing for $14,085.00, which wa.s
the amount of Murphy's bid less the defendant's proportionate share of the bond required from Raff by the
owner. Murphy failed to perform and Raff secured
another contractor to do the work at a cost of $4,200.00
more than Murphy's bid.
Upon this state of facts the lower court awarded
Raff judgment for the excess of cost to do the work over
Murphy's bid and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
"The defendants contend that no contract
ever came into existence between the parties.
When the defendants submitted their bid to the
plaintiff, to be incorporated by it in its joint bid
for the heating and plumbing work, they made
an offer to do that plumbing work for the sum
named, conditioned upon the ultimate awarding
of the contract to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff
in the same telephone conversation requested a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
confiru1ation of the bid by letter, and when, later,
haYing incorporated the defendants' bid in its
own, it heard that the bid had been accepted,
and telephones the information to the defendants,
and stated that upon receipt of formal notice of
the R\Yard of the con tract to it it would notify
them, there 'vas an acceptance of the defendants'
offer and a sufficient communication of that acceptance to constitute a binding contract. In case
of a bilateral contract, acceptance of an offer
need not be express, but Inay be shown 'by any
'vord or acts 'vhich indicate the offeree's assent
to the proposed bargain.' Amer. Law Inst. Restatement, Contracts, p. 68.
"'That both offer and acceptance would become effectual only in the event that the plaintiff's
bid was actually accepted and the contract awarded to it did not detract from the mutuality of
their undertaking; the defendants had no right
to withdraw from their agreement after the plaintiff had accepted their bid, though the contract
had not yet been awarded to it. 2 Williston,
Contracts, § 666. Nor did the fact that the plaintiff, in sending them the order to proceed with
the work, made a deduction from the amount of
their bid, representing a portion of the cost of the
bond it had to file, affect the rights of the parties.
The contract relationship had already been created, and, if the plaintiff had no right to make
this deduction, as upon this record we must assume it did not, the effect would be merely that
it attempted an alteration in the terms of the
contract ineffective because not assented to by
the defendants, and the defendants could have
proceeded with the work and claimed the full
price agreed upon. Barlow Brothers v. Lunny,
102 Conn. 152, 128 A. 115; C. & C. Electric Motor
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Co. v. D. Frisbie & Co., 66 Conn. 67, 94, 33 A.
604."
Since the contract relationship had already been
created between the plaintiff and defendants here, the
sending of the subcontract form, if it contained terms
which the plaintiff had no right to add, and we contend
it did not, would be merely an ine,ffectual attempt to
make an alteration not agreed upon by the defendants,
and the defendants could have held the plaintiff to the
terms of the offer and acceptance. See Raff v. Murphy,
supra.
POINT II.
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS A CONFIRMATION OF THE PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE ·OF THE OFFER AND THE SUBCONTRACT FORM
WAS BUT THE WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF THE CONTRACT
SO CREATED.

Under Point III we will show that the subcontract
form did not add to or vary the terms or conditions of
defendants' offer. It clearly was not intended by the
plaintiff to be a rejection of the offer. Nor could it be
reasonably interpreted by the defendants as a rejection.
Mr. Child did not construe it as a rejection of his offer
for when Mr. Riding called him up on July 14th and
asked him to go to Ogden to lay out the work, Mr. Child
agreed and made an appointment to go the next day
and said nothing about the subcontract form which he
had received or that they were not going to go on with
the work. Mr. Riding's request was certainly no evidence that the plaintiff had rejected the offer, but is
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consistent only \Yith a belief that the deal had been closed.
Rather, the subcontrart forn1 was intended a.s mere
1nen1orial of opera tiYe facts already existing within the
n1eaning of the Restatenzent of the Law of Contracts,
Chapter 3, Seetion 26 .
.. ~lutual n1anifestations of assent that are
themselYes sufficient to make a contract will not
be prevented from so operating by the mere fact
that the parties also manifest an intention to
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof;
* * *"
and the comment thereto:

"'*

It is possible thus to make a contract
to execute subsequently a final writing which
shall contain certain provisions. If parties have
definitely agreed that they will do so, and that
the final writing shall contain these provisions
and no others, they have then fulfilled all the
requisite for the formation of a contract."
* *

See Calumet Ref. Co. v. Star Lub. Co., 64 Utah
3'58, 230 Pac. 1028.
The subcontract form was a written confirmation
of the prior acceptance of the defendants' offer, the
terms of which had been previously expressed and necessarily implied in defendants' letter of June 23rd and
Mr. Riding's promise of the same date.
POINT III.
THE SUBCONTRACT FORM SUBMITTED TO DEFENDANTS WAS NOT A COUNTER-OFFER OR REJECTION OF
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSAL.
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The contract had already been made. If the terms
contained in the sub-contract form or the letter of
transmittal added to or changed the terms of the agreement, it was ineffectual. As stated by the Connecticut
Court in Raff Company v. Murphy, supra:
"Nor did the fact that the plaintiff, in sending
the order to proceed with the work, made a
deduction from the amount of their bid, representing a portion of the cost of the bond it had to
file, affect the rights of the parties. The contract
relationship had already been created, and, if the
plaintiff had no right to make this deduction, as
upon this record we must assume it did not, the
effect would be merely that it attempted an alteration in the terms of the contract ineffective because not assented to by the defendants, and the
defendants could have proceeded with the work
and claimed the full price agreed upon. Barlow
Bros. v. Lunny, 102 Conn. 152, 128 Atl. 115; C &
c· Electric Co. v. Frisbie & Co., 6-6 Conn. 67, 94,
33 A tl. 604."
However, the subcontract form did not add to or
change the terms of the existing contract or the offer of
the defendants. The only points in the subcontract form
to which the defendants voiced any objection at the time
of their refusal to proceed were the words "Time is of
the essence of this contract. General contract to be
completed within 120 calendar days. $50.00 per day
penalty thereafter. Subcontractor to complete his work
as scheduled."
These words certainly did not enlarge the obligations of the defendants over those included in their
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'vritten offer. The \Yords ·~General contract to be cornpleted \Yithin 1:20 calendar days" are merely a statement
of fact, of \Yhich the defendants had notice when they
computed their bid (see SC-1 of the. Specifications).
The srune is true of the penalty for delay (see SC-16 of
the Specifications). They kne\v that these conditions
\vould be imposed upon the plaintiff if it was successful
in obtaining the contract, and of course when they offered
to
··furnish all labor and rnaterials necessary for
the completion of the brickwork * * * according
to plans and specifications"
they knew that time would be of the essence of their
subcontract Ehret Mag. Mfg. Co. v. Gothwaite, 149
Fed. 2d 829.
The phrase "$50.00 per day penalty thereafter"
does. not purport to impose such penalty upon the subcontractor. The appropTiate place in the subcontract
form to accomplish this, if that had been the intention
of the plaintiff, would be in the second paragraph of the
section Second of the subcontract form, and this wa.s
left blank.
Later, during the taking of the depositions, the
questions asked by counsel for the defendants indicated
that the words "S·ubcontractor to complete his work as
scheduled" imposed an additional burden upon the defendants or the making of some schedule for doing the
work which had not been included in the offer and therefore left open something for further negotiation and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
agreement. This contention, however, is absurd. When
the defendants made their bid they knew that completion
of the project required other work to be done by others,
some of which had to be done before the brickwork on
any of the walls could be commenced, and other work
which could not be done until after the brickwork on a
wall was completed. This was a schedule of work which
the defendants proposed to follow when they offered
to do it according to plans and specifications.
The insertion of the words "including Addendum 1"
was also intimated to be a variation from the bid.
Addendum 1 is the addendum which provided the plans
and specifications for the work in the event that the
Government elected to use sliding doors instead of rolling doors. We doubt that the substitution of sliding
doors would have required any change in the brickwork,
but it is immaterial here if it did because the defendants
had bid on the plans and specifications for the ro~ling
door construction and this was the type that the Government chose. The only change in the specifications for
the brick work made by Addendum No. 1 was the addition to 3-05 of the Technical Provisions of the sentence
"J\1asonry shall not be started until concrete 'foundation
has been in place at least 7 days." In reality this is no
change, since Section 2.06 of the Technical Provisions
in the original specifications required the contractor to
keep concrete continuously wet for a period of seven
days More·over, even if this were a change it is trivial
since it could delay the commencement of defendants'
work on the first wall only and the defendants knew
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'vhen they bid that they couldn't start until the concrete
foundations had set. Any delay occasioned by the requirenlent that they be in place not less than seven days
would be a delay occasioned by a delay upon the part
of the contractor (plaintiff) or so1ne other subcontractor
for "\Yhich the defendants "\Yould not be responsible.
The other printed provisions of the subcontract form
are provisions "\Yhich the plans and specifications implied, or 'vhich would normally be implied in the· offer
of the defendants to do the work in part performance
·of the general contract.
Taken in its entirety, the provisions of the subcontract form do not modify the contract already made
nor incorporate other provisions not inherent in the
offer and acceptance. Had the contract not come into
existence previously, the subcontract form and letter
of transmittal could be construed as an unqualified
acceptance of defendants' offer.

Calum-et Ref. Co. v. Star Lub. Co., 64 Utah 358,
230 Pac. 1028.

POINT IV.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE
EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT.

The contract was made, and the defendants are
estopped to deny it, where the plaintiff, in reliance
upon defendants' offer, used the offer in figuring its
bid to the Government and was awarded the contract
and thus assumed a burden which it would not have
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assumed but for defendants' offer, and injustice can
only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise.
The defendants knew that their bid for the brickwork was low, that the plaintiff had used it and relied
upon it in figuring its bid and knew that the plaintiff's
bid was low and plaintiff would probably be awarded
the con tract. Under these circumstances, especially when
coupled with the promise by the plaintiff to give defendants the contract for the brickwork when it got the
contract, the defendants are estopped to deny the existence of the contract.
This rule of law is formulated in the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts in Chapter 3, Section 90 as
follows:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
The application of this rule to facts somewhat
analagous to those in the present case is found in Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W. (2d) 879
(N.D.) which was an action by the prime. contractor
against the subcontractor for breach of contract. In
that case the parties had executed a written subcontract,
but the defendant contended that it was void for lack
of consideration, and the trial court agreed. On appeal
the case was reversed with an opinion reading in part
as follows:
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.. ,,~e are inclined to agree \Yith respondents'
contention and find that the agreen1ent is without
the customary elements of a valid consideration.
Is this fatal to appellant's action~ The pleaded
facts disclose that knowing of appellant's intention and desire to place a bid on the airport project, the respondents proinised to enter into a
binding contract to do the specified work at a
fixed price, this pron1ise was not \vithdrawn, and
relying upon the promise, the appellant submitted
its bid to the government, as contemplated in the
agreement. Obviously it "\Vould seem unjust and
unfair, after appellant was declared the successful bidder and imposed with all the obligations
of such, to allow respondents to then retract their
promise and permit the effect of such retraction
to fall upon the appellant. Other courts have been
confronted with somewhat similar situations to
that which now confronts us. The result has been
that there has arisen in the law a doctrine often
referred to as 'promissory estoppel.' Williston on
Contracts, Revised Edition, p. 494. While the
appellant has not based its argument for a reversal upon this doctrine by name, nevertheless,
we believe that the argument advanced by appellant has as its basis the principle of this doctrine.
The doctrine finds expression in Section 90 of
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, as follows: 'A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on
the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.'

* * *
"* * * We are of the opinion, therefore, that
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the defendants in executing the agreement made
a, promise which they should have reasonably
expected would induce the plaintiff to submit a bid
based thereon to the Government, that such
promise did induce this action, and that injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."
POINT V.
IF THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES AS STIPULATED
WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE
INTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE OFFER
OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
ACTS AND CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF TO CONVEY
SUCH INTENTION TO THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOR
THE JURY, AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS WAS ERROR.

As stated above, there was no actual trial. A jury
had been demanded by the defendants and they had
refused to waive it or to permit the court to weigh the
evidence as the trier of fact on the issue of a contract
vel non.
If the admitted facts are not such as to warrant
the court to hold as a matter of law that a contract did
exist, as we have contended under Points I and II hereof,
they nevertheless presented facts, conceded and disputed, from which a jury could properly find that the
offer of the defendants had been accepted by the plaintiff.
In this respect the case is similar to that considered
by this court in Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac.
(2d) 1002, (supra). There at the close of plaintiff's case,
the court took the case from the jury and granted de-
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fendanfs n1otion for a non suit on the grounds that there
'Yas no evidence that a contract had been entered into.
In holding that this 'Yas error and remanding the case
for ne'Y trial, the court said:
--The question of "'"hether defendants did
accept or assent to plaintiff's offer is a question
of fact. The e'idence being circumstantial, if
there 'Yas any substantial evidence from which
defendants assent or acceptance could have been
inferred, then the case should have been submitted
to the jury."
Mter stating the substance of the evidence, the
court said:
'~(This

evidence) indicates that the defendants considered the matter to be closed and
was sufficient evidence from which defendant's
acceptance and assent to plaintiff's offer might
reasonably be inferred. This should have been
submitted to the jury."
The instant case is stronger, since here the plaintiff
has had no opportunity to elaborate the facts elicited
upon depositions taken for discovery, or to counter
such adverse inferences as presumably the court did
draw from the testimony of the witnesses given by
deposition. The court had only this testimony and the
admissions and statements of counsel taken at pretrial
and it will be noted that in several instances the two
witnesses were in disagreement as to what was said in
the different conversations between Mr. Riding and Mr.
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Child, and in the dates when they occurred. For example, if the conversation relative to the placing of the
reinforcing steel took place after the contract with the
Government had been signed, as Riding testified, and
after Child knew of the award of the contract to the
plaintiff, an inference of acceptance or manifestation
of acceptance might be drawn; where if the conversation
occur:red before then a different inference might be
drawn. Similarly if, as testified to by Mr. Riding,
Mr. Child had ordered the brick for the job, the jury
might reasonably infer that he knew that the offer
had been accepted. The credibility of the two witnesses
on this and other points in which their testimony was in
conflict was for the jury.
POINT VI.
THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITHOUT FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, AND WITHOUT
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NOTICE
THEREOF WAS ERROR.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the only situations in which judgments of dismissal may be entered
without findings and conclusions by the court are
(1) Where findings are waived (Rule 52(c))
(2) On motion under Rule 12, and
(3) On motions for summary judgm~nt under Rule
56.
Findings are required in all other cases (Rule 52).
In the instant case the record is barren of any waiver
of findings by either party.
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The order of disn1issal cannot be construed as a
judg1nent rendered upon a 1notion for sun11nary judgInent under Rule 56, or upon a n1otion for judgn1ent on
the pleadings under Rule 1~ (c). No such 1notion was
eYer 1na.de by either party. No notice of such a n1otion
'vas ever made by either party as required by Rule 56( c)
and notice 'vas not 'vaived, intentionally at least, by the
plaintiff.
~Ioreover, and most important, the matters shown
in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file show
very positively that there remains genuine issues as to
material facts relating to question of the existence or
non existence of a contract between the parties (see Rule
56 (e)). The court made no order "specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy." (See Rule
56( d)).
We are certain that the plaintiff did not understand
or consider the pretrial as a hearing upon a motion for
summary judgment and are reasonably confident that
neither the defendants nor the court so considered it.
The motions made by the parties partakes more of
the nature of a motion for dismissal after the· presentation of plaintiff's case (Rule 41 (b)), but in such case
the Rule requires the court to make findings as provided
in Rule 52 (a), and no findings were made.
The use of the summary judgment as a means of
expediting trials and the caution with which its use
should be exercised has been frequently expressed in
decisions in the Federal Court. One of the most recent
is that of Judge Parker in the case of Pierce v. Ford
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Motor Co., 190 F·ed. (2d) 910 beginning at page 915
in which he says:
"From what we have said, it is clear that
there were issues in the cases for a jury to decide,
and it was error to enter summary judgments for
defendant for that reason. It is only where it is
perfectly clear that there are no issues in the
case that a summary judiment is proper. Even
in cases where the judge is of opinion that he
will have to direct a verdict for one party or the
other on the issues that have been raised, he
should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct
the verdict rather than attempt to try the case
in advance on a motion for summary judgrnent,
which was never intended to enable parties to
evade jury trials or have the judge weigh evidence in advance of its being presented. We
had occasion to deal with the undesirability of
disposing of cases on motions for summary judgment where there was real controversy between
the parties in the recent case of Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 4 Cir., 181 F. 2d 390, 394,
where we said: 'It must not be forgotten that,
in actions at law, trial by jury of disputed questions of fact is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and that even questions of law arising in a case
involving questions of fact can be more· satisfactorily decided when the facts are fully before
the court than is possible upon pleadings and
affidavits. The motion for summary judgment,
authorized by rule 56 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.. C.A., which in effect legalized
the "speaking" demurrer, has an important place
* * * in preventing undue delays in the trial of
actions to which there is no real defense; but it
should be granted only where it is perfectly clear
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that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into
the facts is not desirable to clarify the a pplication of the la,Y. See \\! estinghouse Electric Corp.
Y. Bulldog Electric Products c·o., 4 Cir., 179 F.
:2d 139, 146: -\Vexler v. Maryland State Fair, 4
Cir., 164 F. ~d -1:77. And this is true even where
there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts in
the case but only as to the conclusions to be
drR\Yn therefrom. Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v.
Dennis, 5 Cir., 166 F. 2d 61; Detsch & Co. v .
. .-\..n1erican Products Co., 9 Cir., 152 F·. 2d 473;
Furton v. City of ~fenasha, 7 Cir., 149 F'. 2d 945;
Shea v. Second Nat. Bank, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 406,
133 F. 2d 17, 22. As was said by Mr. Justice
Jackson, speaking for the S·upreme Court in
Sartor v. Arkansas Nat. Gas. Co., 321 U.S. 620,
627, 64 S. Ct. 728, 88 L. Ed. 967: "Rule 56 authorizes summary judgment only where the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
where it is quite clear what the truth is, that no
genuine issue remains for trial, and that the
purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from
their right of trial by jury if they really have
issues to try."'"
See also the opinion of Judge Frank in Colby v.
Klune, 178 Fed. (2d) 872 (2nd Cir.) and the· cases cited
in the footnotes to that opinion.
It should be noted also that the matters submitted
to the court here had been submitted at a pretrial conference called by the court and authorized by Rule 16.
That Rule does not contemplate· a trial of the issues nor
its conversion into a summary trial and disposition of
case by the court as a trier of fact.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment be reversed and the case be remanded for trial in accordance
with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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